Multilateral bargaining with imperfect information

Sandeep Baliga, Roberto Serrano

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

17 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study a multilateral procedure in which responders are told only their own shares. The proposal becomes common knowledge after the response stage and responders have optimistic beliefs after off-equilibrium offers. When discounting is high, the set of equilibrium agreements is a singleton; when it is low, there is a large multiplicity of equilibrium payoffs. In contrast to earlier work, our multiple equilibria are constructed by using strategy profiles in which a responder rejects any offer that reduces his or her own share. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72 and C78.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)578-589
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume67
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1995

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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