Multilateral negotiations with private side-deals: A multiplicity example

Sandeep Baliga; Roberto Serrano

Multilateral negotiations with private side-deals: A multiplicity example

Sandeep Baliga^*, Roberto Serrano

^*Corresponding author for this work

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study a multilateral negotiation procedure that allows for "partial agreements" in which responders are told only their own shares. Applications of our model include negotiations under "joint and several liability." Unlike previous models of multilateral bargaining with exit, we find that there are multiple equilibrium outcomes.

Original language	English (US)
Journal	Economics Bulletin
Volume	3
Issue number	1
State	Published - Dec 1 2001

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

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Multilateral negotiations with private side-deals: A multiplicity example

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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