Multilateral negotiations with private side-deals: A multiplicity example

Sandeep Baliga*, Roberto Serrano

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study a multilateral negotiation procedure that allows for "partial agreements" in which responders are told only their own shares. Applications of our model include negotiations under "joint and several liability." Unlike previous models of multilateral bargaining with exit, we find that there are multiple equilibrium outcomes.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Volume3
Issue number1
StatePublished - Dec 1 2001

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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