Abstract
This short paper discusses recent insights of multitask agency theory. It considers in turn the issues of effort substitution, conflicts between tasks and implicit incentives and 'missions'. It concludes by addressing the problem of optimal task clustering. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 869-877 |
Number of pages | 9 |
Journal | European Economic Review |
Volume | 44 |
Issue number | 4-6 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 2000 |
Funding
Mathias Dewatripont acknowledges support from contract p4/28 of the Interuniversity Poles of attraction Programme of the Belgian Federal State (Prime Minister's Office, Federal Office for Scientific, Technical and Cultural affairs). Ian Jewitt acknowledges support from the UK Economic and Social Research Council and the Leverhulme Foundation.
Keywords
- Incentives
- Moral hazard
- Multiple tasks
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics