Multitask agency problems: Focus and task clustering

Mathias Dewatripont*, Ian Jewitt, Jean Tirole

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    61 Scopus citations

    Abstract

    This short paper discusses recent insights of multitask agency theory. It considers in turn the issues of effort substitution, conflicts between tasks and implicit incentives and 'missions'. It concludes by addressing the problem of optimal task clustering. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)869-877
    Number of pages9
    JournalEuropean Economic Review
    Volume44
    Issue number4-6
    DOIs
    StatePublished - May 2000

    Keywords

    • Incentives
    • Moral hazard
    • Multiple tasks

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

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