Must Differences in Cognitive Value be Transparent?

Sanford Goldberg*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations


Frege's 'differential dubitability' test is a test for differences in cognitive value: if one can rationally believe that p while simultaneously doubting that q, then the contents p and q amount to different 'cognitive values'. If subject S is rational, does her simultaneous adoption of different attitudes towards p and q require that the difference between p and q (as cognitive values) be transparent to her? It is natural to think so. But I argue that, if attitude anti-individualism is true, then rational differential dubitability does not presuppose that differences in cognitive value are transparent. The significance of this argument lies in what it tells us, both about the notion of cognitive value and its relation to the differential dubitability test, but also about the prospects for a Burge-type position which aims to combine attitude anti-individualism with a (qualified) reliance on the differential dubitability test.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)165-187
Number of pages23
Issue number2
StatePublished - Sep 2008


  • Cognitive significance
  • Cognitive value
  • Content
  • Differential dubitability
  • Frege
  • Frege test
  • Sense
  • Transparency

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Logic


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