Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences

Jeffrey C. Ely; Okan Yilankaya

doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2735

Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences

Jeffrey C. Ely^*, Okan Yilankaya

^*Corresponding author for this work

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

51 Scopus citations

Abstract

A population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game G. The payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes. Each individual has preferences over the outcomes of the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to those preferences. However, these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs. When evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take, the distribution of aggregate play must be a Nash equilibrium of G. Weak additional assumptions on the evolutionary process imply perfect equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	255-272
Number of pages	18
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	97
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2735
State	Published - Apr 2001

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1006/jeth.2000.2735

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title = "Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences",

abstract = "A population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game G. The payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes. Each individual has preferences over the outcomes of the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to those preferences. However, these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs. When evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take, the distribution of aggregate play must be a Nash equilibrium of G. Weak additional assumptions on the evolutionary process imply perfect equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.",

author = "Ely, {Jeffrey C.} and Okan Yilankaya",

note = "Funding Information: 1We thank (but exonerate) Eddie Dekel, who contributed substantially to the ideas in this paper. We also thank an anonymous referee for useful comments and suggestions. 2Financial support from NSF Grant 9810787 is gratefully acknowledged. 3Financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged.",

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N2 - A population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game G. The payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes. Each individual has preferences over the outcomes of the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to those preferences. However, these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs. When evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take, the distribution of aggregate play must be a Nash equilibrium of G. Weak additional assumptions on the evolutionary process imply perfect equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.

AB - A population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game G. The payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes. Each individual has preferences over the outcomes of the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to those preferences. However, these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs. When evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take, the distribution of aggregate play must be a Nash equilibrium of G. Weak additional assumptions on the evolutionary process imply perfect equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.

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Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences

Abstract

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