Abstract
A population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game G. The payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes. Each individual has preferences over the outcomes of the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to those preferences. However, these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs. When evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take, the distribution of aggregate play must be a Nash equilibrium of G. Weak additional assumptions on the evolutionary process imply perfect equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 255-272 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Volume | 97 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Apr 2001 |
Funding
1We thank (but exonerate) Eddie Dekel, who contributed substantially to the ideas in this paper. We also thank an anonymous referee for useful comments and suggestions. 2Financial support from NSF Grant 9810787 is gratefully acknowledged. 3Financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics