TY - JOUR
T1 - Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergence to Nash Equilibrium
T2 - The Almost Absolute Continuity Hypothesis
AU - Sandroni, Alvaro
PY - 1998/1
Y1 - 1998/1
N2 - 970572have shown that if play induced by optimal strategies is absolutely continuous with respect to players' beliefs about the future evolution of play, then Bayesian updating eventually leads to Nash equilibrium. However, absolute continuity is not a necessary condition for weak convergence to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, I present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that ensure that Bayesian updating eventually leads to Nash equilibrium. More important, I show that absolute continuity does not rule out any play that is asymptotically consistent with Nash equilibrium play.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: D83.
AB - 970572have shown that if play induced by optimal strategies is absolutely continuous with respect to players' beliefs about the future evolution of play, then Bayesian updating eventually leads to Nash equilibrium. However, absolute continuity is not a necessary condition for weak convergence to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, I present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that ensure that Bayesian updating eventually leads to Nash equilibrium. More important, I show that absolute continuity does not rule out any play that is asymptotically consistent with Nash equilibrium play.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: D83.
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U2 - 10.1006/game.1997.0572
DO - 10.1006/game.1997.0572
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0039065255
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 22
SP - 121
EP - 147
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 1
ER -