Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergence to Nash Equilibrium: The Almost Absolute Continuity Hypothesis

Alvaro Sandroni*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

17 Scopus citations

Abstract

970572have shown that if play induced by optimal strategies is absolutely continuous with respect to players' beliefs about the future evolution of play, then Bayesian updating eventually leads to Nash equilibrium. However, absolute continuity is not a necessary condition for weak convergence to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, I present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that ensure that Bayesian updating eventually leads to Nash equilibrium. More important, I show that absolute continuity does not rule out any play that is asymptotically consistent with Nash equilibrium play.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: D83.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)121-147
Number of pages27
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume22
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1998

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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