Abstract
We describe a model for deploying radiation detectors on a transportation network consisting of two adversaries: a nuclear-material smuggler and an interdictor. The interdictor first installs the detectors. These installations are transparent to the smuggler, and are made under an uncertain threat scenario, which specifies the smuggler's origin and destination, the nature of the material being smuggled, the manner in which it is shielded, and the mechanism by which the smuggler selects a route. The interdictor's goal is to minimize the probability the smuggler evades detection. The performance of the detection equipment depends on the material being sensed, geometric attenuation, shielding, cargo and container type, background, time allotted for sensing and a number of other factors. Using a stochastic radiation transport code (MCNPX), we estimate detection probabilities for a specific set of such parameters, and inform the interdiction model with these estimates.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 207-228 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | Annals of Operations Research |
| Volume | 187 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jul 2011 |
Funding
Acknowledgements The authors thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments that improved the paper. This work has been supported by the National Science Foundation through grants CMMI-0653916 and CMMI-0855577, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency through grant HDTRA1-08-1-0029, and the US Department of Homeland Security under Grant Award Number 2008-DN-077-ARI001-02. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the US Department of Homeland Security.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Decision Sciences
- Management Science and Operations Research