Network market design part II: Spectrum markets

Randall A. Berry

doi:10.1109/MCOM.2012.6353687

Network market design part II: Spectrum markets

Randall A. Berry^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Electrical and Computer Engineering

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

Market-based approaches have promising potential for allocating network resources. Part I of this article introduced the game theoretic underpinnings of market design and argued for the need to jointly consider market design with the underlying engineering issues in communication networks. Example research questions in this area were reviewed for wireline networks. In this part, we turn to network market design for wireless systems and in particular for the flexible sharing of wireless spectrum. We use this as a vehicle for discussing challenges that arise in the design of markets in the presence of externalities.

Original language	English (US)
Article number	6353687
Pages (from-to)	84-90
Number of pages	7
Journal	IEEE Communications Magazine
Volume	50
Issue number	11
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/MCOM.2012.6353687
State	Published - 2012

Funding

The author would like to acknowledge Junjik Bae, Eyal Beigman, Jianwei Huang, Michael Honig Thanh Ngyuen, Vijay Subramanian, Rakesh Vohra, and Hang Zhou; many of ideas in this article emerged from collaborations with these researchers. This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under grants CNS-0519935, CNS-0905407, and CNS-1147786.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computer Science Applications
Computer Networks and Communications
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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10.1109/MCOM.2012.6353687

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abstract = "Market-based approaches have promising potential for allocating network resources. Part I of this article introduced the game theoretic underpinnings of market design and argued for the need to jointly consider market design with the underlying engineering issues in communication networks. Example research questions in this area were reviewed for wireline networks. In this part, we turn to network market design for wireless systems and in particular for the flexible sharing of wireless spectrum. We use this as a vehicle for discussing challenges that arise in the design of markets in the presence of externalities.",

author = "Berry, {Randall A.}",

note = "Funding Information: The author would like to acknowledge Junjik Bae, Eyal Beigman, Jianwei Huang, Michael Honig Thanh Ngyuen, Vijay Subramanian, Rakesh Vohra, and Hang Zhou; many of ideas in this article emerged from collaborations with these researchers. This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under grants CNS-0519935, CNS-0905407, and CNS-1147786.",

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doi = "10.1109/MCOM.2012.6353687",

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AB - Market-based approaches have promising potential for allocating network resources. Part I of this article introduced the game theoretic underpinnings of market design and argued for the need to jointly consider market design with the underlying engineering issues in communication networks. Example research questions in this area were reviewed for wireline networks. In this part, we turn to network market design for wireless systems and in particular for the flexible sharing of wireless spectrum. We use this as a vehicle for discussing challenges that arise in the design of markets in the presence of externalities.

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Network market design part II: Spectrum markets

Abstract

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

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