Abstract
Market-based approaches have promising potential for allocating network resources. Part I of this article introduced the game theoretic underpinnings of market design and argued for the need to jointly consider market design with the underlying engineering issues in communication networks. Example research questions in this area were reviewed for wireline networks. In this part, we turn to network market design for wireless systems and in particular for the flexible sharing of wireless spectrum. We use this as a vehicle for discussing challenges that arise in the design of markets in the presence of externalities.
Original language | English (US) |
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Article number | 6353687 |
Pages (from-to) | 84-90 |
Number of pages | 7 |
Journal | IEEE Communications Magazine |
Volume | 50 |
Issue number | 11 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2012 |
Funding
The author would like to acknowledge Junjik Bae, Eyal Beigman, Jianwei Huang, Michael Honig Thanh Ngyuen, Vijay Subramanian, Rakesh Vohra, and Hang Zhou; many of ideas in this article emerged from collaborations with these researchers. This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under grants CNS-0519935, CNS-0905407, and CNS-1147786.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Science Applications
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering