Network market design part II: Spectrum markets

Randall A. Berry*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

Market-based approaches have promising potential for allocating network resources. Part I of this article introduced the game theoretic underpinnings of market design and argued for the need to jointly consider market design with the underlying engineering issues in communication networks. Example research questions in this area were reviewed for wireline networks. In this part, we turn to network market design for wireless systems and in particular for the flexible sharing of wireless spectrum. We use this as a vehicle for discussing challenges that arise in the design of markets in the presence of externalities.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number6353687
Pages (from-to)84-90
Number of pages7
JournalIEEE Communications Magazine
Volume50
Issue number11
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012

Funding

The author would like to acknowledge Junjik Bae, Eyal Beigman, Jianwei Huang, Michael Honig Thanh Ngyuen, Vijay Subramanian, Rakesh Vohra, and Hang Zhou; many of ideas in this article emerged from collaborations with these researchers. This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under grants CNS-0519935, CNS-0905407, and CNS-1147786.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science Applications
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Network market design part II: Spectrum markets'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this