Abstract
How does the European Union (EU) recruit troops and police to serve in EU peacekeeping missions? This article suggests that pivotal EU member states and EU officials make strategic use of the social and institutional networks within which they are embedded to bargain reluctant states into providing these forces. These networks offer information on deployment preferences, facilitate side-payments and issue-linkages, and provide for credible commitments. EU operations are consequently not necessarily dependent on intra-EU preference convergence—as is often suggested in the existing literature. Rather, EU force recruitment hinges on highly proactive EU actors, which use social and institutional ties to negotiate fellow states into serving in an EU missions.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 901-934 |
| Number of pages | 34 |
| Journal | Security Studies |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Oct 20 2019 |
Funding
The author would like to thank the numerous individuals that agreed to be interviewed for this article. For helpful comments and advice, the author thanks Karen Alter, Felix Berenskoetter, Jakub Eberle, Robert Keohane, Ulrich Krotz, Stephanie Hofmann, Richard Maher, Sophie Meunier, Alister Miskimmon, Andrew Moravcsik, and Hendrik Spruyt, as well as participants at the Max Weber Fellows June Conference and the “Rethinking German Foreign Policy” workshop in Berlin, where earlier versions of this article were presented. The author is also grateful to the Max Weber Program at the European University Institute and the Farrell fellowship at Northwestern University for financial support. James Crisafulli provided excellent research assistance. The author also thanks the anonymous reviewers and editors at Security Studies for particularly valuable help and guidance. Much ink has been spilled on why CSDP operations are launched. Little to no attention has been paid to explaining how these operations become staffed. How does the EU force-recruitment process unfold? This omission motivated the present study. The article made two theoretical claims. First, pivotal EU states play a critical role in recruiting EU forces. Second, in this recruitment process, pivotal EU states instrumentalize social and institutional ties. These networks provide trust and information. They allow for the calling in of favors and facilitate the construction of issue-linkages and side-payments. The case study evidence presented here illustrates many of the posited causal interactions and pathways. The findings of this article have important theoretical and policy implications. First, these findings contribute to our understanding of how EU security cooperation comes about. Many scholars and policy practitioners insist that European cooperation in security and defense requires convergent European threat perceptions and strategic cultures. 143 The findings of this article, however, suggest that, at least in the context of CSDP operations, such preference convergence is not a sine qua non. Rather, what is necessary is strong and unwavering political leadership: CSDP recruitment hinges on highly proactive EU states willing to bargain reluctant participants into joining a collective EU endeavor. If these states are absent, EU officials can pick up the slack. However, given the incapacity of these officials to distribute side-payments and issue-linkages, recruitment goals will be less likely met. Second, these findings suggest that Europe’s dense social and institutional structures are of great use in realizing these force-generation efforts. These ties constitute an invaluable resource to organize collective EU action. Nevertheless, the impact of these networks does not occur automatically, as many scholars focusing on socialization dynamics would posit. Rather, EU member states need to consciously use these institutional and social connections as an organizing tool (for instance, to collect information and construct issue-linkages and side-payments). In this sense, this study makes an important distinction between being connected and using these connections as an instrument. 144 The approach laid out here thus proposes a middle ground between “undersocialized” realist perspectives and “oversocialized” constructivist perspectives of international relations theory. My work suggests that social and institutional networks matter. The sometime endless bilateral and multilateral meetings, summits, champagne receptions, and courtesy calls—all these diplomatic activities contribute in their aggregate to a strategic reservoir. This reservoir enables states to better understand the identities and preferences of their fellow network participants, manipulate them, and thus organize collective EU action. Third, from a policy perspective, the recruitment practices described in this article stipulate that any discussion on the prospect of European security cooperation—in the context of the CSDP but arguably also elsewhere—cannot only focus on the existence or absence of intra- EU preference convergence and the mechanisms that might lead to further harmonization of these preferences. Instead, key questions to ask are: Do pivotal EU actors exist that are willing and able to spearhead the collective mobilization effort? And are these actors capable to exploit the resources that their social and institutional networks provide, or, rather, do they shy away from taking on such a leadership role (that is, Germany in EUPOL Afghanistan)? It is these latter questions that largely determine when and how EU collective mobilization will occur. Outside of the EU context, similar conclusions prevail: collective mobilization does not necessarily require convergent preferences and actions. It can be deliberately constructed if the political will exists. 1 For example, Frédéric Mérand, “Pierre Bourdieu and the Birth of European Defense,” Security Studies 19, no. 2 (April–June 2010): 342–74; Michael Smith, “Toward a Theory of EU Foreign Policy-Making: Multi-Level Governance, Domestic Politics, and National Adaptation to Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy,” Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 4 (February 2004): 740–58; Chris J. Bickerton, “Towards a Social Theory of EU Foreign and Security Policy,” Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 1 (January 2011): 171–90; Jolyon Howorth, “Discourse, Ideas, and Epistemic Communities in European Security and Defence Policy,” West European Politics 27, no. 2 (March 2004): 211–34; Christoph O. Meyer, “The Purpose and Pitfalls of Constructivist Forecasting: Insights from Strategic Culture Research for the European Union’s Evolution as a Military Power,” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 3 (September 2011): 669–90; Christoph O. Meyer and Eva Strickmann, “Solidifying Constructivism: How Material and Ideational Factors Interact in European Defence,” Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 1 (January 2011): 61–81. 2 For example, Benjamin Pohl, “The Logic Underpinning EU Crisis Management Operations,” European Security 22, no. 3 (September 2013): 307–25. 3 For example, Hylke Dijkstra, “The Influence of EU Officials in European Security and Defence,” European Security 21, no. 3 (September 2012): 311–27; Moritz Weiss, “Transaction Costs and the Establishment of the European Security and Defense Policy,” Security Studies 21, no. 4 (October–December 2012): 654–82; Stéphanie C. Hofmann, “Why Institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture,” Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 1 (January 2011): 101–20; Anand Menon, “Power, Institutions and the CSDP: The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 1 (January 2011): 83–100. 4 For example, Barry R. Posen, “European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?” Security Studies 15, no. 2 (April–June 2006): 150–51; Adrian Hyde-Price, “Neorealism: A Structural Approach to CSDP,” in Explaining the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in Action , ed. Xymena Kurowska and Fabian Breuer (New York: Palgrave, 2012); Seth Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Sten Rynning, “Realism and the Common Security and Defence Policy,” Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 1 (January 2011): 23–42. 5 For example, Frédéric Mérand and Antoine Rayroux, “The Practice of Burden Sharing in European Crisis Management Operations,” European Security 25, no. 4 (October 2016): 442–60; Dijkstra, “The Influence of EU Officials in European Security and Defence”; Mai’a K. Davis Cross, Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-Based Networks Are Transforming the European Union (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011), 142; Benjamin Pohl, EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations: Power, Purpose and Domestic Politics (London: Routledge, 2014), 108. 6 For example, Mérand and Rayroux, “The Practice of Burden Sharing in European Crisis Management Operations”; Dijkstra, “The Influence of EU Officials in European Security and Defence”; Giovanna Bono, “The EU’s Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic: An Operation to Save Lives?” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 5, no. 1 (March 2011): 23–42. 7 Cross, Security Integration in Europe , 142; Pohl, EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations , 108; Jolyon Howorth, “Decision-Making in Security and Defense Policy: Towards Supranational Inter-Governmentalism?” Cooperation and Conflict 47, no. 4 (December 2012): 445. 8 The existence of these states has not gone unnoticed in the literature. These states orchestrate politically the launch of a specific mission; they make issues and stakes more salient, drive discussions forward, and attract states to support and serve in the planned CSDP mission. See, for example, Pohl, EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations , 59, 91; Cross, Security Integration in Europe , 135; Alexander Mattelaer, “The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations: The Case of EUFOR TCHAD/RCA,” (working paper, Institute for European Studies, Brussels, 2008); Catherine Gegout, “The Quint: Acknowledging the Existence of a Big Four–US Directoire at the Heart of the European Union’s Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (June 2002): 331–34; Pohl, “The Logic Underpinning EU Crisis Management Operations”; Dijkstra, “The Influence of EU Officials in European Security and Defence;” Marina E. Henke, “Buying Allies: Payment Practices in Multilateral Military Coalition-Building,” International Security 43, no. 4 (Spring 2019): 128–62. 9 Two operations seem to outrank EUFOR Chad-CAR and EUPOL Afghanistan: the EU Military Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA/BiH) and the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM BiH). However, both operations were deployments that the EU inherited from other organizations: EUFOR ALTHEA was the successor deployment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR). EUPM BiH started out as the International Police Task Force (IPTF) of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The force-generation processes for both operations had been handled by NATO and the UN, respectively. On the day of the handover, most troops and police forces simply switched their badges. As a result, both operations seem inappropriate as case studies to understand EU force recruitment. Cf. Hylke Dijkstra, Policy-Making in EU Security and Defense: An Institutional Perspective (London: Palgrave McMillan, 2013), 100, 112. 10 As I explain in greater detail later, Germany and the UK viewed EUFOR Chad-CAR very skeptically, while France disliked the deployment of EUPOL Afghanistan. 11 “Most-similar cases” are intended to provide quasi-experimental comparisons between a treatment case and a control case while holding background features constant. The goal is to maximize variation in Y = force recruitment. See John Gerring and Lee Cojocaru, “Case-Selection: A Diversity of Methods and Criteria” (working paper, Boston, MA 2015), 10; Jason Seawright, Multi-Method Social Science: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Tools (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 90. 12 Seawright, Multi-Method Social Science , 61. 13 Jolyon Howorth, “EU–NATO Cooperation: The Key to Europe’s Security Future,” European Security 26, no. 3 (July 2017): 457. 14 See also, for example, Stanley Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” Daedalus 95, no. 3 (Summer 1966): 862–915; Ulrich Krotz, “Momentum and Impediments: Why Europe Won’t Emerge as a Full Political Actor on the World Stage Soon,” Journal of Common Market Studies 47, no. 3 (June 2009): 555–78; Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher, “International Relations Theory and the Rise of European Foreign and Security Policy,” World Politics 63, no. 3 (July 2011): 548–79. 15 For other important work on coalition building see, for example, Olivier Schmitt, Allies That Count: Junior Partners in Coalition Warfare (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018); David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); Nora Bensahel, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003); Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Gulf War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); Daniel F. Baltrusaitis, Coalition Politics and the Iraq War: Determinants of Choice (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2009); Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Andrew J. Pierre, Coalitions: Building and Maintenance: Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, War on Terrorism (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002). 16 Some exceptions do exist, notably: Katarina Engberg, The EU and Military Operations: A Comparative Analysis (New York: Routledge, 2014) and Pohl, EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations . Nevertheless, the treatment of force generation by both scholars is rather superficial. Engberg, for instance, provides detailed accounts of EU decision-making processes leading to the deployment of EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR Chad-CAR. However, for EUFOR RD Congo she simply lists the participating EU member states without explaining why those states decided to join the operation (102). For EUFOR Chad-CAR, she suggests that France, Poland, and Ireland volunteered forces (129). For Sweden, she goes into the details of the domestic decision-making process (125–26). 17 For example, Antoine Rayroux, L’Union Européenne et le maintien de la paix en Afrique (Montréal: Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 2017), Mérand, “Pierre Bourdieu and the Birth of European Defense”; Smith, “Toward a Theory of EU Foreign Policy-Making’”; Bickerton, “Towards a Social Theory of EU Foreign and Security Policy”; Jolyon Howorth, “The Political and Security Committee : A Case Study in ‘Supranational Inter-Governmentalism’,” Les Cahiers Europeennes de Sciences Po no. 1/2010 (March 2010): 1–24; Gilled Andréani, Christoph Bertram, and Charles Grant, Europe’s Military Revolution (London: Centre for European Reform, 2001), 74–76; Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, “Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture,” International Affairs 77, no. 3 (July 2001): 587–603; Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, “The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report,” International Affairs 81, no. 4 (July 2005): 801–20; Bastian Giegerich, European Security and Strategic Culture: National Responses to the EU’s Security and Defence Policy (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2006); Janne Haaland Matlary, “When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible?” Security Dialogue 37, no. 1 (March 2006): 105–21; Christoph O. Meyer, “Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms,” European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 4 (December 2005): 523–49; Christoph O. Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union , 1st ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Ana E. Juncos and Christopher Reynolds, “The Political and Security Committee: Governing in the Shadow,” European Foreign Affairs Review 12, no. 2 (January 2007): 127–47. 18 Kenneth Glarbo, “Reconstructing a Common European Foreign Policy,” in The Social Construction of Europe , ed. Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jørgensen, and Antje Wiener (London: Sage, 2001), 148, 55. 19 Posen, “European Union Security and Defense Policy,” 150–51. For a similar argument, see also Robert J. Art, “Europe Hedges Its Security Bets,” in Balance of Power Revisited: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century , ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 7–45; Felix Berenskoetter and Bastian Giegerich, “From NATO to ESDP: A Social Constructivist Analysis of German Strategic Adjustment after the End of the Cold War,” Security Studies 19, no. 3 (July–September 2010): 407–52. 20 William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 5–41; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “From Old Thinking to New Thinking in Qualitative Research,” International Security 26, no. 4 (Spring 2002): 93–111; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). 21 Wolfgang Wagner, et al., “Party Politics at the Water’s Edge: Contestation of Military Operations in Europe,” European Political Science Review 10, no. 4 (November 2018): 537–63; Wolfgang Wagner, “Is There a Parliamentary Peace? Parliamentary Veto Power and Military Interventions from Kosovo to Daesh,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20, no. 1 (February 2018): 121–34. 22 Pohl, EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations , 144. The number of troops an EU member state deploys then depends on its “level of enthusiasm” with regard to the specific CSDP mission. 23 Dijkstra, “The Influence of EU Officials in European Security and Defence.” See also Engberg, The EU and Military Operations , 99. 24 For example, Mérand and Rayroux, “The Practice of Burden Sharing in European Crisis Management Operations”; Dijkstra, “The Influence of EU Officials in European Security and Defence”; Howorth, “Decision-Making in Security and Defense Policy,” 445; Cross, Security Integration in Europe , 134, 142; Pohl, EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations , 108. 25 For example, Pohl, EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations , 59, 91; Cross, Security Integration in Europe , 135; Mattelaer, “The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations”; Gegout, “The Quint”; Pohl, “The Logic Underpinning EU Crisis Management Operations”; Dijkstra, “The Influence of EU Officials in European Security and Defence.” 26 This is the EU committee in charge of CSDP operations. Cf. Cross, Security Integration in Europe . 27 Cf. Alexander Mattelaer, The Politico-Military Dynamics of European Crisis Response Operations: Planning, Friction, Strategy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Engberg, The EU and Military Operations , 123. 28 Mérand and Rayroux, “The Practice of Burden Sharing in European Crisis Management Operations,” 449. See also Bono, “The EU’s Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic,” 34; Pohl, EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations , 134. 29 I develop a theory on this topic elsewhere. See Marina E. Henke, “Why Did France Intervene in Mali in 2013? Examining the Role of Intervention Entrepreneurs,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 23, no. 3 (July 2017): 307–23. 30 For example, Stephanie C. Hofmann, “Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP,” Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 1 (March 2009): 45–52; Gorm R. Olsen, “The EU and Conflict Management in African Emergencies,” International Peacekeeping 9, no. 3 (February 2002): 87–102; Catherine Gegout, “The West, Realism and Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1996–2006),” International Peacekeeping 16, no. 2 (April 2009): 231–44; Bruno Charbonneau, “What Is So Special about the European Union? EU–UN Cooperation in Crisis Management in Africa,” International Peacekeeping 16, no. 4 (August 2009): 552. 31 Tentative plans are often already developed prior to EU Council agreement. 32 To a certain degree this is a dynamic process: the development of operational plans and force generation overlap and inform each other. Mattelaer, “The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations”; Mattelaer, The Politico-Military Dynamics of European Crisis Response Operations . 33 John Kiszely, “Coalition Command in Contemporary Operations,” Whitehall Report 1-08 (London: RUSI, 2008), 8. 34 At times, nongovernmental ties can, of course, also play a role. However, I leave this to future research. 35 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Alexander H. Montgomery, “Power Positions: International Organizations, Social Networks, and Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 1 (February 2006). 36 Loosely following Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, I define “practices” as patterned actions that “reproduce similar behaviors with regular meanings.” See Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, “International Practices: Introduction and Framework,” in International Practices , ed. Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 7. 37 Vincent Pouliot, International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 29. 38 Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 (May 1973): 1360–80; Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017), 188. 39 Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot, and Iver B. Neumann, ed., Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 223; Iver B. Neumann, At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 19. 40 Pouliot, International Pecking Orders , 63; David Bosco, “Assessing the UN Security Council: A Concert Perspective,” Global Governance 20, no. 4 (October 2014): 551–52; Juncos and Reynolds, “Political and Security Committee,” 144. 41 Military capabilities matter less if the key goal of additional force recruitment is to boost the legitimacy of the operation. Otherwise they are critical. They are a first filter. Information on intrinsic motivations and external incentives serve are a second filter. 42 Thomas Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organization 54, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 10–11. 43 As research on negotiations has shown, favorable distributions of interests are not sufficient for generating win-win outcomes in bargaining situations. See, for instance, Michael Tomz, Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 16; Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Stephen D. Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 336–66; Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff, eds., The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999); David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gain (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987); Carsten K. W. de Dreu, Sander L. Koole, and Wolfgang Steinel, “Unfixing the Fixed Pie: A Motivated Information-Processing Approach to Integrative Negotiation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79, no. 6 (December 2000): 975–87; Kathleen O’Connor and Peter J. Carnevale, “A Nasty but Effective Negotiation Strategy: Misrepresentation of a Common-Value Issue,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 23, no. 5 (May 1997): 504–15; Mara Olekalns and Philip L. Smith, “Mutually Dependent: Power, Trust, Affect and the Use of Deception in Negotiation,” Journal of Business Ethics 85, no. 3 (March 2009): 347–48; Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!’,” 21. 44 Ernst B. Haas, “International Integration: The European and the Universal Process,” International Organization 15, no. 3 (Summer 1961): 366–92; Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1984); Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1992); Susanne Lohmann, “Linkage Politics,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 1 (February 1997): 38–67. Shlomo Weber and Hans Wiesmeth, “Issue Linkage in the European Community,” Journal of Common Market Studies 29, no. 3 (March 1991): 255–67. 45 The construction of side-payments and issue-linkages bears costs. See, for example, Bernard M. Hoekman, “Determining the Need for Issue Linkages in Multilateral Trade Negotiations,” International Organization 43, no. 4 (Autumn 1989): 697; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston, MA: Little and Brown 1977), 30; Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe , 65; Ernst B. Haas, “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes,” World Politics 32, no. 3 (April 1980): 357–405. 46 Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 159–60. 47 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Alexander Cooley and Hendrik Spruyt, Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). 48 T. K. Das and Bing-Sheng Teng, “Between Trust and Control: Developing Confidence in Partner Cooperation in Alliances,” Academy of Management Review 23, no. 3 (July 1998): 494; William D. Leach and Paul A. Sabatier, “To Trust an Adversary: Integrating Rational and Psychological Models of Collaborative Policymaking,” American Political Science Review 99, no. 4 (November 2005): 492; Heidi Hardt, Time to React: The Efficiency of International Organizations in Crisis Response (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 101; Brian C. Rathbun, “Before Hegemony: Generalized Trust and the Creation and Design of International Security Organizations,” International Organization 65, no. 2 (April 2011): 243–73; Ronald S. Burt, Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 93–101; Alexander Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon, “Interpersonal Networks and International Security: US–Georgia Relations during the Bush Administration,” in The New Power Politics: Networks and Transnational Security Governance , ed. Deborah Avant and Oliver Westerwinter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 79. 49 For an example of what I refer to as “oversocialized” approach, see Jeffrey T. Checkel “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,” International Organization 59, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 801–26. For the “undersocialized” approach, see, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 5–49. 50 For example, Liesbet Hooghe, “Supranational Activists or Intergovernmental Agents? Explaining the Orientations of Senior Commission Officials toward European Integration,” Comparative Political Studies 32, no. 4 (June 1999): 435–63; Jeffrey Lewis “Is the ‘Hard Bargaining’ Image of the Council Misleading? The Committee of Permanent Representatives and the Local Elections Directive,” Journal of Common Market Studies 36, no. 4 (December 1998): 479–504; Jan Beyers and Guido Dierickx, “The Working Groups of the Council of the European Union: Supranational or Intergovernmental Negotiations?” Journal of Common Market Studies 36, no. 3 (September 1998): 289–317. 51 Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe,” 810; Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements . (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 25–26. 52 Pohl, EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations , 144. The number of troops an EU member state deploys then depends on its “level of enthusiasm” with regard to the specific CSDP mission. 53 See, for instance, Jennifer Sterling-Folker, Theories of International Cooperation and the Primacy of Anarchy: Explaining US International Monetary Policy-Making after Bretton Woods (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 9–10; Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 485–507. 54 As quoted in Brian C. Rathbun, Diplomacy’s Value: Creating Security in 1920s Europe and the Contemporary Middle East (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 13. 55 For example, Dijkstra, Policy-Making in EU Security and Defense , 89. At the UN similar assumptions have been made. See, for instance, Alexander J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams with Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping , 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010), 57. 56 Dijkstra, Policy-making in EU Security and Defense , 11. 57 For similar dynamics see, for example, Cullen S. Hendrix and Wendy H. Wong, “When Is the Pen Truly Mighty? Regime Type and the Efficacy of Naming and Shaming in Curbing Human Rights Abuses,” British Journal of Political Science 43, no. 3 (July 2013): 651–72; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, “Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem,” International Organization 62, no. 4 (Fall 2008): 689–716. 58 David Collier, Henry E. Brady, and Jason Seawright, “Outdated Views of Qualitative Methods: Time to Move On,” Political Analysis 18, no. 4 (Autumn 2010): 506. 59 See United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1778, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1778 . 60 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP): Appeal 2007 for Chad,” https://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/consolidated-appeals-process-cap-appeal-2007-chad . 61 Chad and the CAR are both former French colonies. Moreover, France maintains an important military base in Chad. See, for example, Guillaume Etienne, “ L’opération EUFOR TCHAD/RCA: Succès et limites d’une initiative Européenne ” (Paris: Terra Nova, 2009); Ronald Marchal, “Understanding French Policy toward Chad/Sudan? A Difficult Task, Parts 1–3,” African Arguments ; Bono, “The EU’s Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic.” 62 Mattelaer, “The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations;” Dijkstra, Policy-making in EU Security and Defense , 147. France primarily picked the EU (instead of, for example, the UN) as the institutional vehicle for the operation because it thought that the EU would be quicker to organize a deployment. 63 Bono, “The EU’s Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic.” 64 On the individual decisions see, for example, Mattelaer, “The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations,” 14. 65 Pohl, EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations , 134. 66 Mattelaer, The Politico-Military Dynamics of European Crisis Response Operations , 62. 67 Author’s interview with Pat Nash, EUFOR Commander, Cork, June 2011. 68 Mattelaer, “The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations.” 69 Nash, interview with author. 70 Cable, Embassy Paris to US secretary of state, “Chad/C.A.R.: French Views on Force Generation,” 16 November 2007. Document available from author. 71 Author’s interview with French Official, Paris, February 2011. 72 Nash, interview with author. 73 Additional states sent staff to the operation headquarters in Paris. 74 Author’s interview with French official, Brussels, February 2011. 75 Dan Harvey, Peace Enforcers: The EU Military Intervention in Chad (Dublin: Book Republic, 2010), 58. 76 Author’s interview with Dan Harvey, Dublin, May 2011. 77 Bertie Ahern, Bertie Ahern: The Autobiography (New York: Random House, 2009), 1. 78 Author’s interview with French official, Paris, February 2011; Author’s interview with Irish official, Newbridge, May 2011; “Bertie’s High-Risk Foreign Adventure,” Phoenix , 8 February 2008. 79 Author’s interview with Irish officials, Dublin, May 2011. See also “Bertie’s High-Risk Foreign Adventure”; Lara Marlowe, “A Safe Pair of Hands Take Charge of EU Force in Chad,” Irish Times , 29 January 2008. Ahern had first made his interest in the EU presidency known in August 2007. By mid-2007, the other contenders for the position were former British prime minister Tony Blair and the prime minister of Luxembourg, Jean-Claude Juncker. France had initially backed Blair as its preferred candidate for EU president. Nevertheless, Blair was a difficult candidate to back. He had little support in most other EU member states, chiefly because of his steadfast support for the US invasion in Iraq. Therefore, France was willing to reconsider its position. That being said, it would not do so without any political payoff. 80 Author’s interview with Michael Howard, Newbridge, May 2011. 81 Tom Clonan, “Army’s African Mission Marks Watershed for EU,” Irish Times , 28 September 2007. 82 Adam Harvey, “Irish General to Command 3500 Troop Mission in Chad,” Irish Times , 3 October 2007; Philippe Bernard and Laurent Zecchini, “Paris financera l’essentiel de l’opération Tchad-CAR,” Le Monde , 4 October 2007. 83 Author’s interview with Polish diplomat, Brussels, December 2009. 84 “EU Elder Juncker Floats Compromise with Poland,” Reuters News , 21 June 2007. 85 Author’s interview with Polish diplomat, Brussel, December 2009. The Krakow Post provided an almost identical explanation in their issue of 25 October 2007. Michal Wojtas, “Poland to Take Part in the EU Mission in Chad,” Krakow Post , 25 October 2007, http://www.krakowpost.com/article/664 . 86 “Polish Defence Minister Confirms Sending Troops to Chad, Pullout from Iraq,” BBC Monitoring Europe , 30 November 2007. 87 “French Parliament Report on the Costs of Foreign Interventions,” 1 July 2009, www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/i1790.asp#P1848_59421 . 88 “73 Prozent gegen den Tschad Einsatz,” www.oe24.at/oesterreich/politik/73-Prozent-gegen-den-Tschad-Einsatz/227424 . 89 Interview with Undersecretary Hans Winkler for the Tiroler Tageszeitung , 25 August 2007. The Austrian military and, in particular, its Special Forces, had an interest in the Chad operation. In their eyes, it constituted an interesting “training” opportunity in Africa, where they lacked substantial hands-on experience. 90 “Austria to Send ‘up to 240’ Soldiers to Chad for EU Mission,” BBC Monitoring Europe , 7 November 2007. 91 Author’s interview with Austrian diplomat, Princeton, NJ, December 2009. 92 Author’s interview with Austrian diplomat, Vienna, July 2010. 93 Ibid. 94 Engberg, The EU and Military Operations , 125. 95 Pohl, EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations , 149. 96 “Russie Partenariats avec l’OTAN et l’UE,” Le Monde , 13 March 2008. 97 Laurent Zecchini, “Moscou continue de coopérer avec l’OTAN sur l’Afghanistan et l’UE sur le Tchad,” Le Monde , 13 September 2008. 98 Jonna Buckley, “Can the EU Be More Effective in Afghanistan?” Policy Brief (Center for European Reform, London, 27 April 2010). 99 European Court of Auditors, “The EU Police Mission in Afghanistan: Mixed Results,” (European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg, 2015), 9. 100 Japan settled on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, Italy on justice reform, the UK on combating drugs, and the United States on rebuilding the army. 101 House of Lords, “The EU’s Afghan Police Mission” (2011), 42. 102 Pohl, EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations , 100; Peter Dahl Thruelsen, “Striking the Right Balance: How to Rebuild the Afghan National Police,” International Peacekeeping 17, no. 1 (March 2010): 83. 103 Steffen Eckhard, International Assistance to Police Reform: Managing Peacebuilding (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 162; Pohl, EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations , 101. 104 Pohl, “The Logic Underpinning EU Crisis Management Operations,” 320. 105 Maxime H. A. Larivé, “From Speeches to Actions: EU Involvement in the War in Afghanistan through the EUPOL Afghanistan Mission,” European Security 21, no. 2 (April 2012): 191. 106 Pohl, EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations , 102; Eva Gross, “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The EU’s Contribution,” Occasional Paper 78 (European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, April 2009), 28. 107 Eckhard, International Assistance to Police Reform , 163; Pohl, EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations , 105. 108 Thierry Tardy, “EUPOL Afghanistan 2007/16: Mission Impossible?” Brief Issue 22 (European Union Institute for Security Studies, Brussels, July 2017), 2; Buckley, “Can the EU Be More Effective in Afghanistan?,” 4; Edward Burke, “Game Over? The EU’s Legacy in Afghanistan,” (working paper, FRIDE, Madrid, 2014), 14. 109 Eckhard, International Assistance to Police Reform , 162. 110 European Council, “Report Following the Joint EU Assessment Mission on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan between 20–21 September 2006” (European Council, Brussels, 2006). 111 Gross, Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan , 28. 112 Eckhard, International Assistance to Police Reform , 163. 113 Ibid. This was to be achieved primarily by reassigning those officers already working for the German police project and sending some additional ones. 114 Pohl, EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations , 108. 115 House of Lords, “The EU’s Afghan Police Mission,” 28. 116 European Council, “Council Conlusions on Afghanitsan. 2870th External Relations Council Meeting. Brussels, 26 and 27 May 2008” (European Council, Brussels, 2008). Pohl suggests that the personnel increase was “a unilateral decision by the German foreign minister.” Several EU member states and the EU Council Secretariat opposed the idea: “they warned, warned – nothing, run over [by Berlin].” See Pohl, EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations , 112–13 117 Burke, “Game Over?’,” 13. 118 House of Lords, “The EU’s Afghan Police Mission,” 44; Tardy, “EUPOL Afghanistan 2007/16,” 2. 119 European Court Auditors, “The EU Police Mission in Afghanistan,” 16. 120 The core mission, ethos, and organizational cultures of police forces and military forces are fundamentally different. Police forces traditionally do not deploy abroad and have much less spare capacity. Moreover, specialization is often needed, and this limits applicants. Some countries also have police forces that are not nationally controlled but are under the purview of local state governments (for example, Germany). 121 Tardy, “EUPOL Afghanistan 2007/16,” 2. European Court Auditors, “The EU Police Mission in Afghanistan,” 17; Eckhard, International Assistance to Police Reform , 165. Disappointed at its EU allies’ lack of vigor, Washington refused to extend the protection of the American armed forces to EUPOL staff and joined Turkey in obstructing an agreement between the EU and NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). See Ronja Kempin and Jocelyn Mawdsley, “The Common Security and Defence Policy as an Act of American Hegemony,” European Security 22, no. 1 (January 2013): 67. 122 Strong political leadership could have arguably overcome some of the obstacles described in the previous two footnotes. 123 Burke, “‘Game Over?’,” 6. 124 Author’s phone interview with Kai Vittrup, head of EUPOL, January 2018. 125 Author’s phone interview with Vygaudas Usackas, head of EU delegation in Afghanistan and EU special representative, January 2018. 126 Usackas, interview with author. 127 Ibid. 128 House of Lords, “The EU’s Afghan Police Mission,” 28. The civilian operation commander, who is also the director of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), exercises command and control of EUPOL at a strategic level, under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee. The head of mission exercises operational control over EUPOL and assumes its day-to-day management. 129 Buckley, “Can the EU Be More Effective in Afghanistan?” 130 Vittrup, interview with author. 131 Author phone interview with Kees Klompenhouwer, head of CPCC, January 2018. 132 Vittrup, interview with author. 133 Eckhard, International Assistance to Police Reform , 162. 134 Pohl also suggests that Finland wanted to offset its very limited military engagement in Afghanistan with greater efforts in the civilian arena. See Pohl, EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations , 101. 135 Usackas, interview with author. 136 Burke, “Game Over?’,” 5. 137 Pohl, EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations , 102, 105. 138 Klompenhouwer, interview with author. 139 Ibid. 140 Any CSDP operation is composed of seconded and contracted staff. Seconded staff come from member states. Contracted staff, predominantly in charge of administrative tasks, are directly hired by the CSDP operation (that is, the head of mission). In the case of EUPOL Afghanistan, some contracted staff (not all) were used to fulfill tasks normally fulfilled by seconded staff. 141 EU seconded civilian personnel would get €1,000 as a monthly allowance from the EU in addition to their regular national salary. 142 Were the bureaucratic recruitment differences between police and military forces insurmountable? Pohl suggests that EU governments could have overcome these obstacles “by prioritizing support for the mission within domestic bureaucracies. Their reluctance to cut corners revealed that many EU governments did not in fact attach utmost importance to this mission, despite official proclamations to the contrary.” See Pohl, EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations , 121. I agree with this assessment. For example, EU member states could have provided extra political and financial incentives to their police forces to deploy to Afghanistan—if the political will had existed. 143 For example, Howorth, “EU–NATO Cooperation,” 457; Krotz and Maher, “International Relations Theory and the Rise of European Foreign and Security Policy,” 565; Krotz, “Momentum and Impediments.” 144 This is a novel approach, at least in the international relations literature. See, for example, Seok-Woo Kwon and Paul S. Adler, “Social Capital: Maturation of a Field of Research,” Academy of Management Review 39, no. 4 (October 2014): 412–22.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Political Science and International Relations
