Networking as a barrier to entry and the competitive supply of venture capital

Yael V. Hochberg*, Alexander Ljungqvist, Yang Lu

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

133 Scopus citations

Abstract

We examine whether strong networks among incumbent venture capitalists (VCs) in local markets help restrict entry by outside VCs, thus improving incumbents' bargaining power over entrepreneurs. More densely networked markets experience less entry, with a one-standard deviation increase in network ties among incumbents reducing entry by approximately one-third. Entrants with established ties to target-market incumbents appear able to overcome this barrier to entry; in turn, incumbents react strategically to an increased threat of entry by freezing out any incumbents who facilitate entry into their market. Incumbents appear to benefit from reduced entry by paying lower prices for their deals.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)829-859
Number of pages31
JournalJournal of Finance
Volume65
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2010

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Networking as a barrier to entry and the competitive supply of venture capital'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this