Non-cooperative equilibrium with price discriminating firms

Daniel F. Spulber*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

17 Scopus citations

Abstract

There exists a unique, non-cooperative equilibrium in output levels for a group of firms which sell differentiated products and are able to practice first degree price discrimination. The equilibrium does not maximize joint profits.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)221-227
Number of pages7
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume4
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1979

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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