Non-optimal mechanism design

Jason D Hartline, Brendan Lucier

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

13 Scopus citations

Abstract

The optimal allocation of resources in complex environments-like allocation of dynamic wireless spectrum, cloud computing services, and Internet advertising-is computationally challenging even given the true preferences of the participants. In the theory and practice of optimization in complex environments, a wide variety of special and general purpose algorithms have been developed; these algorithms produce outcomes that are satisfactory but not generally optimal or incentive compatible. This paper develops a very simple approach for converting any, potentially non-optimal, algorithm for optimization given the true participant preferences, into a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism that weakly improves social welfare and revenue.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)3102-3124
Number of pages23
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume105
Issue number10
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2015

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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