Abstract
A 2-person fixed threat bargaining problem is considered. A full characterization of the solutions which satisfy all of Nash's axioms except for the axiom of symmetry is given. It is also shown that these nonsymmetric Nash solutions are precisely the solutions that arise from symmetric Nash solutions through replications.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 129-133 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Volume | 6 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Sep 1977 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Statistics and Probability
- Mathematics (miscellaneous)
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty