Norms of credibility

Jennifer Lackey*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, I explore whether there is a need for a multiplicity of norms governing belief due to differences in the objects of those beliefs, particularly the difference between persons and nonpersons. I call the view according to which there is a single epistemic norm governing belief monism, and the view that there is more than one such norm pluralism. I consider three different kinds of objections to monism that stem specifically from considerations unique to assessing the credibility of persons, along with corresponding pluralist proposals. I argue not only that all of the criticisms of monism fail, but also that the proposed pluralist norms face significant problems of their own. In so doing, the aim of the paper is to clear the path for there being a single epistemic norm governing belief, despite there being important epistemic differences between how we ought to treat persons and nonpersons.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)323-337
Number of pages15
JournalAmerican Philosophical Quarterly
Volume54
Issue number4
StatePublished - Oct 2017

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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