(NOT) SEEING LIKE AN ALGORITHM: MANAGERIAL CONTROL AND WORKER RESISTANCE IN THE PLATFORM ECONOMY

Lindsey D. Cameron; Hatim A. Rahman

doi:10.5465/AMBPP.2021.237

(NOT) SEEING LIKE AN ALGORITHM: MANAGERIAL CONTROL AND WORKER RESISTANCE IN THE PLATFORM ECONOMY

Lindsey D. Cameron, Hatim A. Rahman

Management and Organizations

Research output: Contribution to journal › Conference article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Drawing on workers' experiences from a comparative ethnography of two of the largest platform organizations, we found that platforms' use of algorithms to control workers made worker outcomes more visible, but worker activities leading to those outcomes were difficult for the algorithm to observe. Specifically, we found workers devised covert resistance tactics to manipulate the platforms' algorithmic rating systems in order to maintain high ratings. Taken together, our findings extend prior theories of control and resistance by characterizing the role of visibility asymmetry and demonstrating how these asymmetries transform visibility into a strategic engine of workers' resistance.

Original language	English (US)
Journal	Academy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedings
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2021.237
State	Published - 2021
Event	81st Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management 2021: Bringing the Manager Back in Management, AoM 2021 - Virtual, Online Duration: Jul 29 2021 → Aug 4 2021

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Management Information Systems
Management of Technology and Innovation
Industrial relations

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(NOT) SEEING LIKE AN ALGORITHM: MANAGERIAL CONTROL AND WORKER RESISTANCE IN THE PLATFORM ECONOMY

Abstract

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