On information theoretic interference games with more than two users

Randall A. Berry; Suvarup Saha

doi:10.1109/ITWKSPS.2010.5503215

On information theoretic interference games with more than two users

Randall A. Berry, Suvarup Saha

Electrical and Computer Engineering

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider a model for information theoretic games on interference channels introduced in previous work. The players in these games are the users, who autonomously select their encoding and decoding strategy with the objective of maximizing their own rate. In previous work, a Nash equilibrium region for this game was defined and completely characterized for two-user linear deterministic interference channels. In particular for such channels it was shown that there always exists an efficient Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we consider extending this to models with more than two users. We show that some of the analysis extends to networks with more than two users, however, significant differences also emerge. For example, it may no longer be the case that there are always efficient equilibria.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	IEEE Information Theory Workshop 2010, ITW 2010
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ITWKSPS.2010.5503215
State	Published - Jul 27 2010
Event	IEEE Information Theory Workshop 2010, ITW 2010 - Cairo, Egypt Duration: Jan 6 2010 → Jan 8 2010

Publication series

Name	IEEE Information Theory Workshop 2010, ITW 2010

Other

Other	IEEE Information Theory Workshop 2010, ITW 2010
Country/Territory	Egypt
City	Cairo
Period	1/6/10 → 1/8/10

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computational Theory and Mathematics
Theoretical Computer Science

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10.1109/ITWKSPS.2010.5503215

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title = "On information theoretic interference games with more than two users",

abstract = "We consider a model for information theoretic games on interference channels introduced in previous work. The players in these games are the users, who autonomously select their encoding and decoding strategy with the objective of maximizing their own rate. In previous work, a Nash equilibrium region for this game was defined and completely characterized for two-user linear deterministic interference channels. In particular for such channels it was shown that there always exists an efficient Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we consider extending this to models with more than two users. We show that some of the analysis extends to networks with more than two users, however, significant differences also emerge. For example, it may no longer be the case that there are always efficient equilibria.",

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AU - Saha, Suvarup

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AB - We consider a model for information theoretic games on interference channels introduced in previous work. The players in these games are the users, who autonomously select their encoding and decoding strategy with the objective of maximizing their own rate. In previous work, a Nash equilibrium region for this game was defined and completely characterized for two-user linear deterministic interference channels. In particular for such channels it was shown that there always exists an efficient Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we consider extending this to models with more than two users. We show that some of the analysis extends to networks with more than two users, however, significant differences also emerge. For example, it may no longer be the case that there are always efficient equilibria.

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M3 - Conference contribution

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T3 - IEEE Information Theory Workshop 2010, ITW 2010

BT - IEEE Information Theory Workshop 2010, ITW 2010

T2 - IEEE Information Theory Workshop 2010, ITW 2010

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ER -

On information theoretic interference games with more than two users

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