On p-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality

Tai Wei Hu*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper shows that common p-belief of rationality implies p-rationalizability for games with compact strategy sets. We also establish the Bayesian foundation for the perfect p-rationalizability for finite games. The p-rationalizability is then used to analyze the robustness of rationalizable sets. For any game with compact strategy sets, we show that the rationalizable set is robust, i.e., the strategies characterized by common p-belief of rationality are close to the rationalizable set when p → 1.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)379-391
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume136
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 2007

Keywords

  • Common knowledge
  • Common p-belief
  • Rationalizable sets

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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