### Abstract

In previous work we have studied the use of sequential second price auctions for sharing a wireless resource, such as bandwidth or power. The resource is assumed to be managed by a spectrum broker (auctioneer), who collects bids and allocates discrete units of the resource. It is well known that a second price auction for a single indivisible good has an efficient dominant strategy equilibrium; this is no longer the case when multiple units of a homogeneous good are sold in repeated iterations. Previous work attempted to bound this inefficiency loss for two users with non-increasing marginal valuations and full information. This work was based on studying a setting in which one agent's valuation for each resource unit is strictly larger than any of the other agent's valuations and assuming a certain property of the price paid by such a dominant user in any sub-game. Using this assumption it was shown that the worst-case efficiency loss was no more than e ^{-1}. However, here we show that this assumption is not satisfied for all non-increasing marginals with this dominance property. In spite of this, we show that it is always true for the worst-case marginals for any number of goods and so the worst-case efficiency loss for any non-increasing marginal valuations is still bounded by e ^{-1}.

Original language | English (US) |
---|---|

Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 |

Pages | 199-205 |

Number of pages | 7 |

DOIs | |

State | Published - 2009 |

Event | 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 - Istanbul, Turkey Duration: May 13 2009 → May 15 2009 |

### Publication series

Name | Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 |
---|

### Other

Other | 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 |
---|---|

Country | Turkey |

City | Istanbul |

Period | 5/13/09 → 5/15/09 |

### ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Computer Networks and Communications
- Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition

## Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'On the efficiency of sequential auctions for spectrum sharing'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

## Cite this

*Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09*(pp. 199-205). [5137402] (Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09). https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137402