On the efficiency of sequential auctions for spectrum sharing

Junjik Bae*, Eyal Beigman, Randall Berry, Michael L. Honig, Rakesh Vohra

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

In previous work we have studied the use of sequential second price auctions for sharing a wireless resource, such as bandwidth or power. The resource is assumed to be managed by a spectrum broker (auctioneer), who collects bids and allocates discrete units of the resource. It is well known that a second price auction for a single indivisible good has an efficient dominant strategy equilibrium; this is no longer the case when multiple units of a homogeneous good are sold in repeated iterations. Previous work attempted to bound this inefficiency loss for two users with non-increasing marginal valuations and full information. This work was based on studying a setting in which one agent's valuation for each resource unit is strictly larger than any of the other agent's valuations and assuming a certain property of the price paid by such a dominant user in any sub-game. Using this assumption it was shown that the worst-case efficiency loss was no more than e -1. However, here we show that this assumption is not satisfied for all non-increasing marginals with this dominance property. In spite of this, we show that it is always true for the worst-case marginals for any number of goods and so the worst-case efficiency loss for any non-increasing marginal valuations is still bounded by e -1.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
Pages199-205
Number of pages7
DOIs
StatePublished - 2009
Event2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 - Istanbul, Turkey
Duration: May 13 2009May 15 2009

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09

Other

Other2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
CountryTurkey
CityIstanbul
Period5/13/095/15/09

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition

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    Bae, J., Beigman, E., Berry, R., Honig, M. L., & Vohra, R. (2009). On the efficiency of sequential auctions for spectrum sharing. In Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 (pp. 199-205). [5137402] (Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09). https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137402