On the use of menus in sequential common agency

Giacomo Calzolari, Alessandro Pavan*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We illustrate, by means of two examples, why assuming the principals offer simple menus (i.e. collections of payoff-relevant alternatives) as opposed to more general mechanisms may preclude a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes in certain sequential contracting environments. We then discuss how refinements of the solution concept, or enrichments of the menus that allow for recommendations, may restore the possibility of using menus to obtain a complete equilibrium characterization.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)329-334
Number of pages6
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume64
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 2008

Keywords

  • Mechanism design
  • Menus theorems
  • Sequential contracting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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