TY - JOUR
T1 - One mandarin benefits the whole clan
T2 - Hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime
AU - Do, Quoc Anh
AU - Nguyen, Kieu-Trang
AU - Tran, Anh N.
PY - 2017/10/1
Y1 - 2017/10/1
N2 - We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions' impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials' promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted toward small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown.
AB - We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions' impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials' promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted toward small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown.
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U2 - 10.1257/app.20130472
DO - 10.1257/app.20130472
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85029890071
SN - 1945-7782
VL - 9
SP - 1-29.pd
JO - American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
JF - American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
IS - 4
ER -