TY - JOUR
T1 - Open Negotiation
T2 - The Back-End Benefits of Salespeople’s Transparency in the Front End
AU - Atefi, Yashar
AU - Ahearne, Michael
AU - Hohenberg, Sebastian
AU - Hall, Zachary
AU - Zettelmeyer, Florian
N1 - Funding Information:
The third author gratefully acknowledges support from the Julius Paul Stiegler Memorial Foundation and the University of Texas at Austin.
PY - 2020/12/1
Y1 - 2020/12/1
N2 - Negotiations today are less likely to be characterized by information asymmetry—the notion that buyers are less informed than sellers—due to the amount of information available to buyers. A number of industries have reacted to this change by shifting their attention to earning profits in aftermarkets: products and services that augment the main purchase (e.g., add-ons, insurance, financing, service and maintenance). In these aftermarkets, firms often retain an information advantage, even if information asymmetries are eliminated from the main purchase. This has given rise to an interesting setting untapped by prior research: information “symmetry” in the front end (main purchase) and information “asymmetry” in the back end (aftermarket). The authors argue that symmetry in the front end provides an opportunity to build trust, as the knowledgeable customer can verify the information disclosed by the seller. In an observational study in the automotive industry, the authors find that customers to whom the salesperson revealed the cost of a car at the beginning of the negotiation spent significantly more in the back end than others. As corroborated in subsequent studies, this effect holds only when cost is disclosed at the beginning of the negotiation and when customers can verify the cost information.
AB - Negotiations today are less likely to be characterized by information asymmetry—the notion that buyers are less informed than sellers—due to the amount of information available to buyers. A number of industries have reacted to this change by shifting their attention to earning profits in aftermarkets: products and services that augment the main purchase (e.g., add-ons, insurance, financing, service and maintenance). In these aftermarkets, firms often retain an information advantage, even if information asymmetries are eliminated from the main purchase. This has given rise to an interesting setting untapped by prior research: information “symmetry” in the front end (main purchase) and information “asymmetry” in the back end (aftermarket). The authors argue that symmetry in the front end provides an opportunity to build trust, as the knowledgeable customer can verify the information disclosed by the seller. In an observational study in the automotive industry, the authors find that customers to whom the salesperson revealed the cost of a car at the beginning of the negotiation spent significantly more in the back end than others. As corroborated in subsequent studies, this effect holds only when cost is disclosed at the beginning of the negotiation and when customers can verify the cost information.
KW - aftermarkets
KW - information asymmetry
KW - information disclosure
KW - negotiation
KW - trust
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85094907688&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85094907688&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1177/0022243720951153
DO - 10.1177/0022243720951153
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85094907688
VL - 57
SP - 1076
EP - 1094
JO - Journal of Marketing Research
JF - Journal of Marketing Research
SN - 0022-2437
IS - 6
ER -