Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing: Beyond linear utility ?

Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline, Yingkai Li

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationACM EC 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages885-886
Number of pages2
ISBN (Electronic)9781450367929
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 17 2019
Event20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2019 - Phoenix, United States
Duration: Jun 24 2019Jun 28 2019

Publication series

NameACM EC 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Conference

Conference20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2019
CountryUnited States
CityPhoenix
Period6/24/196/28/19

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Marketing
  • Computer Science (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Computational Mathematics
  • Statistics and Probability

Cite this

Feng, Y., Hartline, J. D., & Li, Y. (2019). Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing: Beyond linear utility ? In ACM EC 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (pp. 885-886). (ACM EC 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation). Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. https://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329603