Optimal crowdsourcing contests

Shuchi Chawla*, Jason D Hartline, Balasubramanian Sivan

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

65 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing contests. Crowdsourcing contests can be modeled as all-pay auctions because entrants must exert effort up-front to enter. Unlike all-pay auctions where a usual design objective would be to maximize revenue, in crowdsourcing contests, the principal only benefits from the submission with the highest quality. We give a theory for optimal crowdsourcing contests that mirrors the theory of optimal auction design: the optimal crowdsourcing contest is a virtual valuation optimizer (the virtual valuation function depends on the distribution of contestant skills and the number of contestants). We also compare crowdsourcing contests with more conventional means of procurement. In this comparison, crowdsourcing contests are relatively disadvantaged because the effort of losing contestants is wasted. Nonetheless, we show that crowdsourcing contests are 2-approximations to conventional methods for a large family of "regular" distributions, and 4-approximations, otherwise.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 23rd Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2012
Pages856-868
Number of pages13
StatePublished - Apr 30 2012
Event23rd Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2012 - Kyoto, Japan
Duration: Jan 17 2012Jan 19 2012

Publication series

NameProceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Other

Other23rd Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2012
CountryJapan
CityKyoto
Period1/17/121/19/12

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Mathematics(all)

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