TY - GEN

T1 - Optimal crowdsourcing contests

AU - Chawla, Shuchi

AU - Hartline, Jason D

AU - Sivan, Balasubramanian

PY - 2012/4/30

Y1 - 2012/4/30

N2 - We study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing contests. Crowdsourcing contests can be modeled as all-pay auctions because entrants must exert effort up-front to enter. Unlike all-pay auctions where a usual design objective would be to maximize revenue, in crowdsourcing contests, the principal only benefits from the submission with the highest quality. We give a theory for optimal crowdsourcing contests that mirrors the theory of optimal auction design: the optimal crowdsourcing contest is a virtual valuation optimizer (the virtual valuation function depends on the distribution of contestant skills and the number of contestants). We also compare crowdsourcing contests with more conventional means of procurement. In this comparison, crowdsourcing contests are relatively disadvantaged because the effort of losing contestants is wasted. Nonetheless, we show that crowdsourcing contests are 2-approximations to conventional methods for a large family of "regular" distributions, and 4-approximations, otherwise.

AB - We study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing contests. Crowdsourcing contests can be modeled as all-pay auctions because entrants must exert effort up-front to enter. Unlike all-pay auctions where a usual design objective would be to maximize revenue, in crowdsourcing contests, the principal only benefits from the submission with the highest quality. We give a theory for optimal crowdsourcing contests that mirrors the theory of optimal auction design: the optimal crowdsourcing contest is a virtual valuation optimizer (the virtual valuation function depends on the distribution of contestant skills and the number of contestants). We also compare crowdsourcing contests with more conventional means of procurement. In this comparison, crowdsourcing contests are relatively disadvantaged because the effort of losing contestants is wasted. Nonetheless, we show that crowdsourcing contests are 2-approximations to conventional methods for a large family of "regular" distributions, and 4-approximations, otherwise.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84860151940&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84860151940&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:84860151940

SN - 9781611972108

T3 - Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

SP - 856

EP - 868

BT - Proceedings of the 23rd Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2012

T2 - 23rd Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2012

Y2 - 17 January 2012 through 19 January 2012

ER -