Optimal disclosure decisions when there are penalties for nondisclosure

Ronald A. Dye

doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12197

Optimal disclosure decisions when there are penalties for nondisclosure

Ronald A. Dye^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Accounting Information and Management

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20 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study a seller of an asset who is liable for damages if the seller fails to disclose to buyers an estimate of the asset's value he knew prior to the sale. Our results include as either the “damages multiplier” that determines the size of the damages the seller must pay buyers increases, or as the probability the seller is caught withholding his estimate from buyers increases, the seller discloses his estimate less often, and as the precision of the seller's estimate increases, he sells a larger fraction of the asset.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	704-732
Number of pages	29
Journal	RAND Journal of Economics
Volume	48
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12197
State	Published - Sep 1 2017

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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Optimal disclosure decisions when there are penalties for nondisclosure

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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