Optimal project rejection and new firm start-ups

Bruno Cassiman*, Masako Ueda

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

71 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the decision of an established firm to commercialize innovations. An innovation can be exploited by the established firm as an internal venture, pursued by a new firm start-up as an external venture, or not commercialized at all. The limited commercialization capacity of the established firm in the short run results in an option value of waiting. In this setup, start-up firms emerge when the established firm is generating many innovations or is selective because the option value of waiting is high, or both. The model predicts that innovations commercialized through internal ventures are characterized by a higher fit with the internal resources of the established firm, a higher cannibalization of the established firm's existing businesses, and a lower profitability than innovations commercialized through external ventures. The model furthermore generates predictions on the relation between firm performance and spin-off performance.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)262-275
Number of pages14
JournalManagement Science
Volume52
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2006

Keywords

  • Bargaining
  • IPR
  • New firm start-ups
  • Project selection
  • Real option

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Strategy and Management
  • Management Science and Operations Research

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