TY - JOUR
T1 - Optimal selling procedures with fixed costs
AU - Cornelli, Francesca
PY - 1996/10
Y1 - 1996/10
N2 - This paper studies the optimal selling procedures for a monopolist, when consumers valuations are unknown and there are fixed costs. The fixed costs introduce a positive externality among customers: each customer benefits from the presence of others who help cover the fixed costs. In this context it is optimal for the monopolist to make the probability of each individual being served contingent on the valuations of all the other consumers. The monopolist therefore sets a minimum price and then lets each customer contribute as much as he wishes. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, D82, L31.
AB - This paper studies the optimal selling procedures for a monopolist, when consumers valuations are unknown and there are fixed costs. The fixed costs introduce a positive externality among customers: each customer benefits from the presence of others who help cover the fixed costs. In this context it is optimal for the monopolist to make the probability of each individual being served contingent on the valuations of all the other consumers. The monopolist therefore sets a minimum price and then lets each customer contribute as much as he wishes. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, D82, L31.
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U2 - 10.1006/jeth.1996.0106
DO - 10.1006/jeth.1996.0106
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0030268712
VL - 71
SP - 1
EP - 30
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
SN - 0022-0531
IS - 1
ER -