Wang et al.Â (CCS 2017) recently proposed a protocol for malicious secure two-party computation that represents the state-of-the-art with regard to concrete efficiency in both the single-execution and amortized settings, with or without preprocessing. We show here several optimizations of their protocol that result in a significant improvement in the overall communication and running time. Specifically: We show how to make the “authenticated garbling” at the heart of their protocol compatible with the half-gate optimization of Zahur et al.Â (Eurocrypt 2015). We also show how to avoid sending an information-theoretic MAC for each garbled row. These two optimizations give upÂ to a 2.6 × improvement in communication, and make the communication of the online phase essentially equivalent to that of state-of-the-art semi-honest secure computation.We show various optimizations to their protocol for generating AND triples that, overall, result in a 1.5 × improvement in the communication and a 2 × improvement in the computation for that step.