TY - JOUR
T1 - Out-group conflict, in-group unity? Exploring the effect of repression on intramovement cooperation
AU - McLauchlin, Theodore
AU - Pearlman, Wendy
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and receipt of the research support from the United States Institute of Peace and Palestinian-American Research Center.
PY - 2012/2
Y1 - 2012/2
N2 - Does repression increase or decrease unity within ethnic or nationalist movements? Conventional wisdom lends itself to two contradictory predictions. On one hand, it is said that conflict with an out-group is the surest path to unity in an in-group. On the other hand, repression exaggerates the gap between radicals and moderates in a movement. Challenging both views, this article argues that repression amplifies trends in cooperation or conflict existent in a movement before the onset of repression. All movements have some institutional arrangement, meaning a set of procedures and relationships that structure decision making and behavior. These "rules of the game" distribute power within the movement, and thus favor some actors over others. Repression disrupts the equilibrium of these institutions, after which the members might engage in either more cooperation or more conflict, depending on the level of satisfaction with preexisting institutional arrangements. The authors illustrate these propositions through comparative analysis of four repression shocks from two nationalist movements: the Kurdish movement in Iraq and the Palestinian national movement.
AB - Does repression increase or decrease unity within ethnic or nationalist movements? Conventional wisdom lends itself to two contradictory predictions. On one hand, it is said that conflict with an out-group is the surest path to unity in an in-group. On the other hand, repression exaggerates the gap between radicals and moderates in a movement. Challenging both views, this article argues that repression amplifies trends in cooperation or conflict existent in a movement before the onset of repression. All movements have some institutional arrangement, meaning a set of procedures and relationships that structure decision making and behavior. These "rules of the game" distribute power within the movement, and thus favor some actors over others. Repression disrupts the equilibrium of these institutions, after which the members might engage in either more cooperation or more conflict, depending on the level of satisfaction with preexisting institutional arrangements. The authors illustrate these propositions through comparative analysis of four repression shocks from two nationalist movements: the Kurdish movement in Iraq and the Palestinian national movement.
KW - Cooperation
KW - Fragmentation
KW - Nationalist movements
KW - Nonstate actors
KW - Repression
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U2 - 10.1177/0022002711429707
DO - 10.1177/0022002711429707
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84859296736
SN - 0022-0027
VL - 56
SP - 41
EP - 66
JO - Journal of Conflict Resolution
JF - Journal of Conflict Resolution
IS - 1
ER -