Pandora's auctions: Dynamic matching with unknown preferences

Daniel Fershtman; Alessandro Pavan

doi:10.1257/aer.p20171043

Pandora's auctions: Dynamic matching with unknown preferences

Daniel Fershtman, Alessandro Pavan

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	186-190
Number of pages	5
Journal	American Economic Review
Volume	107
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171043
State	Published - May 2017

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1257/aer.p20171043

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title = "Pandora's auctions: Dynamic matching with unknown preferences",

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year = "2017",

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Pandora's auctions: Dynamic matching with unknown preferences

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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