Partial exposure in large games

Ronen Gradwohl*, Omer Reingold

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

12 Scopus citations


In this work we introduce the notion of partial exposure, in which the players of a simultaneous-move Bayesian game are exposed to the realized types and chosen actions of a subset of the other players. We show that in any large simultaneous-move game, each player has very little regret even after being partially exposed to other players. If players are given the opportunity to be exposed to others at the expense of a small decrease in utility, players will decline this opportunity, and the original Nash equilibria of the game will survive.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)602-613
Number of pages12
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number2
StatePublished - Mar 2010


  • Ex post Nash
  • Large games
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Noncooperative games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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