Abstract
In this work we introduce the notion of partial exposure, in which the players of a simultaneous-move Bayesian game are exposed to the realized types and chosen actions of a subset of the other players. We show that in any large simultaneous-move game, each player has very little regret even after being partially exposed to other players. If players are given the opportunity to be exposed to others at the expense of a small decrease in utility, players will decline this opportunity, and the original Nash equilibria of the game will survive.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 602-613 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume | 68 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Mar 2010 |
Funding
✩ We would like to thank Ehud Kalai and Yaron Azrieli for interesting and useful conversations. We are grateful to Ariel Yadin and Amir Yehudayoff for helpful discussions throughout the course of this research. We also thank seminar participants at Northwestern University and at the Technion. Finally, we are grateful to the anonymous referees for valuable input. * Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (R. Gradwohl), [email protected] (O. Reingold). 1 Work done while the author was a student at the Department of Computer Science and Applied Mathematics, The Weizmann Institute of Science. 2 Research supported by US–Israel Binational Science Foundation Grants 2002246 and 2006060.
Keywords
- Ex post Nash
- Large games
- Nash equilibrium
- Noncooperative games
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics