Partially-specified large games

Ehud Kalai*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to strategic and informational details presents a difficulty in applying it to games which are not fully specified. Structurally-robust Nash equilibria are less sensitive to such details. Moreover, they arise naturally in important classes of games that have many semi-anonymous players. The paper describes this condition and its implications.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationInternet and Network Economics - First International Workshop, WINE 2005, Proceedings
Pages3-13
Number of pages11
DOIs
StatePublished - 2005
Event1st International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2005 - Hong Kong, China
Duration: Dec 15 2005Dec 17 2005

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume3828 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other1st International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2005
CountryChina
CityHong Kong
Period12/15/0512/17/05

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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