Payment card regulation and the use of economic analysis in antitrust

Jean Tirole*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    10 Scopus citations

    Abstract

    Akey input of our modern economies, payment cards are ubiquitous; debit and credit cards offer a wide range of alternatives to cash and checks to operate brick and mortar, e- and mobile phone, and P2P payments. The contours of the industry are rapidly changing. The payment card industry is also becoming one of the most heavily regulated industries in some parts of the world. The United States and Europe, as well as a number of other jurisdictions across the world, have been or are in the process of regulating, inter alia, the network-determined payment made by the merchant's bank (called the acquirer) to the cardholder's bank (the issuer). This "Interchange Fee" has been the object of much controversy and the theoretical underpinnings of its regulation are still debated. The primary object of this note is to clarify the considerations that should be brought to bear on the determination of regulated fees. It argues that some broadly contemplated regulatory methodologies bear only limited resemblance with economically sound precepts. Finally, it derives some implications of these regulations for the likely evolution of the payment card industry.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)136-158
    Number of pages23
    JournalCompetition Policy International
    Volume7
    Issue number1
    StatePublished - Mar 1 2011

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Political Science and International Relations
    • Law

    Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Payment card regulation and the use of economic analysis in antitrust'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this