Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter?

Wojciech Olszewski*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

I consider two player games, where player 1 can use only pure strategies, and player 2 can use mixed strategies. I indicate a class of such games with the property that under public randomization both the discounted and the undiscounted finitely repeated perfect folk theorems do hold, but the discounted theorem does not without public randomization. Further, I show that the class contains games such that without public randomization the un-discounted theorem does not hold, as well as games such that without public randomization the undiscounted theorem does hold.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)147-156
Number of pages10
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume27
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1998

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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