Persistent equilibria in strategic games

E. Kalai; D. Samet

doi:10.1007/BF01769811

Persistent equilibria in strategic games

E. Kalai^*, D. Samet

^*Corresponding author for this work

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

94 Scopus citations

Abstract

A perfect equilibrium [Selten] can be viewed as a Nash equilibrium with certain properties of local stability. Simple examples show that a stronger notion of local stability is needed to eliminate unreasonable Nash equilibria. The persistent equilibrium is such a notion. Properties of this solution are studied. In particular, it is shown that in each strategic game there exists a pesistent equilibrium which is perfect and proper.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	129-144
Number of pages	16
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	13
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01769811
State	Published - Sep 1984

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Statistics and Probability
Mathematics (miscellaneous)
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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abstract = "A perfect equilibrium [Selten] can be viewed as a Nash equilibrium with certain properties of local stability. Simple examples show that a stronger notion of local stability is needed to eliminate unreasonable Nash equilibria. The persistent equilibrium is such a notion. Properties of this solution are studied. In particular, it is shown that in each strategic game there exists a pesistent equilibrium which is perfect and proper.",

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AB - A perfect equilibrium [Selten] can be viewed as a Nash equilibrium with certain properties of local stability. Simple examples show that a stronger notion of local stability is needed to eliminate unreasonable Nash equilibria. The persistent equilibrium is such a notion. Properties of this solution are studied. In particular, it is shown that in each strategic game there exists a pesistent equilibrium which is perfect and proper.

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Persistent equilibria in strategic games

Abstract

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