Persistent equilibria in strategic games

E. Kalai*, D. Samet

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

89 Scopus citations

Abstract

A perfect equilibrium [Selten] can be viewed as a Nash equilibrium with certain properties of local stability. Simple examples show that a stronger notion of local stability is needed to eliminate unreasonable Nash equilibria. The persistent equilibrium is such a notion. Properties of this solution are studied. In particular, it is shown that in each strategic game there exists a pesistent equilibrium which is perfect and proper.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)129-144
Number of pages16
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume13
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1984

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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