TY - JOUR
T1 - Player types and self-impression management in dictatorship games
T2 - Two experiments
AU - Murnighan, J. Keith
AU - Oesch, John M.
AU - Pillutla, Madan
N1 - Funding Information:
Recent experimental research on dictatorship games shows that many dictators share their outcomes with unknown, anonymous others. The data suggests that dictators can be “typed” as rational (taking the maximum), equal (spli tting outcomes equally), or “other.” This paper experimentally tests the self-impression management model, which predicts that individuals act to show themselves in a positive light, even when they are the only observer of their own behavior. The model predicts that the “other” type of dictator will avoid being greedy by taking more only as their choices are increasingly restricted. Results from two experiments support the model’s predictions. The conclusion advocates differentiating basic psychological motivations in modeli ng individual behavior. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, C91, D63. 2001 Academic Press 1This research was generously supported by the Dispute Resolution Research Center in the Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University. We are particularly grateful for the comments provided by Gary Bolt on, Rachel Croson, Deepak Malh otra, Richard Thaler, an anonymous reviewer, and the participants in an experimental economics seminar at the University of Pittsburgh and at the 1998 Economic Science Association meetings on a previous version of this paper.
PY - 2001
Y1 - 2001
N2 - Recent experimental research on dictatorship games shows that many dictators share their outcomes with unknown, anonymous others. The data suggests that dictators can be "typed" as rational (taking the maximum), equal (splitting outcomes equally), or "other." This paper experimentally tests the self-impression management model, which predicts that individuals act to show themselves in a positive light, even when they are the only observer of their own behavior. The model predicts that the "other" type of dictator will avoid being greedy by taking more only as their choices are increasingly restricted. Results from two experiments support the model's predictions. The conclusion advocates differentiating basic psychological motivations in modeling individual behavior. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, C91, D63.
AB - Recent experimental research on dictatorship games shows that many dictators share their outcomes with unknown, anonymous others. The data suggests that dictators can be "typed" as rational (taking the maximum), equal (splitting outcomes equally), or "other." This paper experimentally tests the self-impression management model, which predicts that individuals act to show themselves in a positive light, even when they are the only observer of their own behavior. The model predicts that the "other" type of dictator will avoid being greedy by taking more only as their choices are increasingly restricted. Results from two experiments support the model's predictions. The conclusion advocates differentiating basic psychological motivations in modeling individual behavior. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, C91, D63.
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U2 - 10.1006/game.2001.0847
DO - 10.1006/game.2001.0847
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0035204543
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 37
SP - 388
EP - 414
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 2
ER -