Political economy in a changing world

Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov, Konstantin Sonin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

We provide a general framework for the analysis of institutional dynamics in an environment in which payoffs and political powers change stochastically. Assuming that economic and political institutions as well as individual types can be ordered, and preferences and the distribution of political power satisfy natural “single-crossing” (increasing differences) conditions, we prove existence of a pure-strategy Markov voting equilibrium, provide conditions for its uniqueness, and present a number of comparative static results. We then use this framework to study the dynamics of political rights and repression in the presence of threats from extremist groups and the dynamics of collective experimentation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1038-1086
Number of pages49
JournalJournal of Political Economy
Volume123
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2015

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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