Political pressures and the evolution of disclosure regulation

Jeremy Bertomeu*, Robert P. Magee

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper examines the process that drives the formation and evolution of disclosure regulations. In equilibrium, changes in the regulation depend on the status quo, standard-setters’ political accountability and underlying objectives, and the cost and benefits of disclosure to reporting entities. Excessive political accountability need not implement the regulation preferred by diversified investors. Political pressures slow standard-setting and, if the standard-setter prefers high levels of disclosure, induce regulatory cycles characterized by long phases of increasing disclosure requirements followed by a sudden deregulation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)775-802
Number of pages28
JournalReview of Accounting Studies
Volume20
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2015

Keywords

  • Certification
  • Disclosure
  • Financial reporting
  • Mandatory
  • Political
  • Positive economics
  • Standard

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)

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