Political shirking, opponent quality, and electoral support

David N. Figlio*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

20 Scopus citations

Abstract

Several recent papers in the public choice literature suggest that legislators shirk, or vote in a manner contrary to constituent interest. This paper explores the relationship between senatorial shirking and electoral consequences. I model political shirking, opponent quality and election outcomes as simultaneous, and find significant evidence of a relationship between shirking over the senatorial term and electoral outcomes. However, I find that voters punish recent shirking much more than they punish early-term shirking, and that senators apparently act consistently with this relationship.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)271-284
Number of pages14
JournalPublic Choice
Volume103
Issue number3-4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2000

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Economics and Econometrics

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