Abstract
Smart speakers come with always-on microphones to facilitate voice-based interaction. To address user privacy concerns, existing devices come with a number of privacy features: e.g., mute buttons and local trigger-word detection modules. But it is difficult for users to trust that these manufacturerprovided privacy features actually work given that there is a misalignment of incentives: Google, Meta, and Amazon benefit from collecting personal data and users know it. What's needed is perceptible assurance-privacy features that users can, through physical perception, verify actually work. To that end, we introduce, implement, and evaluate the idea of "intentionally-powered" microphones to provide users with perceptible assurance of privacy with smart speakers. We employed an iterative-design process to develop Candid Mic, a battery-free, wireless microphone that can only be powered by harvesting energy from intentional user interactions. Moreover, users can visually inspect the (dis)connection between the energy harvesting module and the microphone. Through a within-subjects experiment, we found that Candid Mic provides users with perceptible assurance about whether the microphone is capturing audio or not, and improves user trust in using smart speakers relative to mute button interfaces.
Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Title of host publication | 32nd USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2023 |
Publisher | USENIX Association |
Pages | 2473-2490 |
Number of pages | 18 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781713879497 |
State | Published - 2023 |
Event | 32nd USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2023 - Anaheim, United States Duration: Aug 9 2023 → Aug 11 2023 |
Publication series
Name | 32nd USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2023 |
---|---|
Volume | 4 |
Conference
Conference | 32nd USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2023 |
---|---|
Country/Territory | United States |
City | Anaheim |
Period | 8/9/23 → 8/11/23 |
Funding
This work was generously supported, in part, by Cisco and the National Science Foundation through grant SaTC 2029519. We are grateful to Anna Osterholm and John Reynolds for helping us fabricate the display. We thank the GVU Prototyping Lab for providing the fabrication facility. We would also like to thank members of the SPUD lab who provided valuable feedback throughout our research. Finally, we thank our anonymous reviewers for their feedback.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Information Systems
- Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality