Practical Interests and Reasons for Belief

Baron Reed*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This chapter examines the relationship between the practical and the epistemic. It rejects two broad ways of thinking about that relationship-pragmatic encroachment and an epistemology centered on the truth norm-before offering a new approach, which explains epistemic normativity as arising from our practical commitment to a social practice that has arisen from our need to share information with one another. The chapter discusses the way in which the social practice view captures the importance of knowledge and epistemic reasons to action, while preventing our practical interests from playing a disruptive role in how we arrive at our beliefs.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationNormativity
Subtitle of host publicationEpistemic and Practical
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages200-220
Number of pages21
ISBN (Print)9780198758709
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 22 2018

Fingerprint

Social Practice
Reasons for Belief
Epistemology
Epistemic Normativity

Keywords

  • Knowledge
  • Normativity
  • Pragmatism
  • Rationality
  • Reasons
  • Truth

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Reed, B. (2018). Practical Interests and Reasons for Belief. In Normativity: Epistemic and Practical (pp. 200-220). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198758709.003.0011
Reed, Baron. / Practical Interests and Reasons for Belief. Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press, 2018. pp. 200-220
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Reed, B 2018, Practical Interests and Reasons for Belief. in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press, pp. 200-220. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198758709.003.0011

Practical Interests and Reasons for Belief. / Reed, Baron.

Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press, 2018. p. 200-220.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

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Reed B. Practical Interests and Reasons for Belief. In Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press. 2018. p. 200-220 https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198758709.003.0011