Preemption and the Problem of the Predatory Expert

Jennifer Lackey*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


What kind of reasons for belief are provided by the testimony of experts? In a world where we are often inundated with fake news, misinformation, and conspiracy theories, this question is more pressing than ever. A prominent view in the philosophical literature maintains that the reasons provided by experts are preemptive in that they normatively screen off, or defeat, other relevant reasons. In this paper, I raise problems for this conception of expertise, including a wholly new one that I call the Problem of the Predatory Expert, which targets both original versions of preemption as well as new, modified ones that aim to avoid some of the standard objections.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)133-150
Number of pages18
JournalPhilosophical Topics
Issue number2
StatePublished - Sep 2021

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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