TY - JOUR
T1 - Preemptive Bidding and the Role of the Medium of Exchange in Acquisitions
AU - Fishman, Michael
PY - 1989/1/1
Y1 - 1989/1/1
N2 - The medium of exchange in acquisitions is studied in a model where (i) bidders' offers bring forth potential competition and (ii) targets and bidders are asymmetrically informed. In equilibrium, both securities and cash offers are observed. Securities have the advantage of inducing target management to make an efficient accept/reject decision. Cash has the advantage of serving, in equilibrium, to “preempt” competition by signaling a high valuation for the target. Implications concerning the medium of exchange of an offer, the probability of acceptance, the probability of competing bids, expected profits, and the costs of bidders are derived. 1989 The American Finance Association
AB - The medium of exchange in acquisitions is studied in a model where (i) bidders' offers bring forth potential competition and (ii) targets and bidders are asymmetrically informed. In equilibrium, both securities and cash offers are observed. Securities have the advantage of inducing target management to make an efficient accept/reject decision. Cash has the advantage of serving, in equilibrium, to “preempt” competition by signaling a high valuation for the target. Implications concerning the medium of exchange of an offer, the probability of acceptance, the probability of competing bids, expected profits, and the costs of bidders are derived. 1989 The American Finance Association
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U2 - 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb02403.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb02403.x
M3 - Article
SN - 0022-1082
VL - 44
SP - 41
EP - 57
JO - The Journal of Finance
JF - The Journal of Finance
IS - 1
ER -