Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma

Ehud Kalai

doi:10.1016/0165-4896(81)90015-9

Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma

Ehud Kalai^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

22 Scopus citations

Abstract

In order to improve outcomes of one shot noncooperative games a formal procedure for conducting preplay negotiations is proposed. For the prisoners' dilemma game it is shown that all the perfect equilibrium in the induced game (the game with the preplays) yield the cooperative pay-off. For another game it is shown that all perfect equilibrium payoffs converge to be Pareto optimal as the number of preplays increases.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	375-379
Number of pages	5
Journal	Mathematical social sciences
Volume	1
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(81)90015-9
State	Published - Aug 1981

Keywords

Cooperative game
Pareto optimum
Perfect equilibrium
Prisoners' dilemma

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Sociology and Political Science
Social Sciences(all)
Psychology(all)
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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10.1016/0165-4896(81)90015-9

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KW - Perfect equilibrium

KW - Prisoners' dilemma

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Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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