Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma

Ehud Kalai*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

25 Scopus citations


In order to improve outcomes of one shot noncooperative games a formal procedure for conducting preplay negotiations is proposed. For the prisoners' dilemma game it is shown that all the perfect equilibrium in the induced game (the game with the preplays) yield the cooperative pay-off. For another game it is shown that all perfect equilibrium payoffs converge to be Pareto optimal as the number of preplays increases.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)375-379
Number of pages5
JournalMathematical social sciences
Issue number4
StatePublished - Aug 1981


  • Cooperative game
  • Pareto optimum
  • Perfect equilibrium
  • Prisoners' dilemma

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • General Social Sciences
  • General Psychology
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


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