Preventing Crime Waves

Philip Bond, Kathleen Hagerty

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the design of enforcement mechanisms when enforcement resources are chosen ex ante and are inelastic ex post. Multiple equilibria arise naturally. We identify a new answer to the old question of why non-maximal penalties are used to punish moderate actions: "marginal" penalties are much more attractive in the Pareto inferior crime wave equilibrium. Specifically, although marginal penalties have both costs and benefits, the net benefit is strictly positive in the crime wave equilibrium. In contrast, marginal penalties frequently have a net cost in the noncrime wave equilibrium. We also show that increasing enforcement resources may worsen crime.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)138-159
Number of pages22
JournalAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Volume2
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1 2010

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Preventing Crime Waves'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this