TY - JOUR
T1 - Primacy Effects in Justice Judgments
T2 - Testing Predictions from Fairness Heuristic Theory
AU - Lind, E. Allan
AU - Kray, Laura
AU - Thompson, Leigh
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank Kees van den Bos and Riel Vermunt for their valuable comments on a previous version of this article. Research reported in this article was supported by grants to Allan Lind from the American Bar Foundation and the National Science Foundation (SBR-96-96244 and SES-91-13863) and to Leigh Thompson from the National Science Foundation (SES-9210298 and PYI-9157447). Address correspondence and reprint requests to E. Allan Lind, Fuqua School of Business, Box 90120, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708-0120. E-mail: Alind@mail.duke.edu. 189
PY - 2001/7
Y1 - 2001/7
N2 - We tested predictions from fairness heuristic theory that justice judgments are more sensitive to early fairness-relevant information than to later fairness-relevant information and that this primacy effect is more evident when group identification is higher. Participants working on a series of three tasks experienced resource failures that interfered with their productivity and always had the possibility of explaining problems to a supervisor. In a manipulation of the timing of fairness-relevant experiences, the supervisor refused to consider explanations on the first, second, or third of three work trials (but did consider explanations on the other two trials) or the supervisor never refused to hear the explanations. Prior to the work periods, the participants either had or had not undergone a manipulation designed to induce greater identification with the work group. As predicted, the timing of fairness-relevant experiences showed a primacy effect on fairness judgments and acceptance of authority in the high identification conditions and no evidence of such an effect in the low identification conditions. The implications of the findings for understanding the psychology of justice and for real-world justice phenomena are discussed.
AB - We tested predictions from fairness heuristic theory that justice judgments are more sensitive to early fairness-relevant information than to later fairness-relevant information and that this primacy effect is more evident when group identification is higher. Participants working on a series of three tasks experienced resource failures that interfered with their productivity and always had the possibility of explaining problems to a supervisor. In a manipulation of the timing of fairness-relevant experiences, the supervisor refused to consider explanations on the first, second, or third of three work trials (but did consider explanations on the other two trials) or the supervisor never refused to hear the explanations. Prior to the work periods, the participants either had or had not undergone a manipulation designed to induce greater identification with the work group. As predicted, the timing of fairness-relevant experiences showed a primacy effect on fairness judgments and acceptance of authority in the high identification conditions and no evidence of such an effect in the low identification conditions. The implications of the findings for understanding the psychology of justice and for real-world justice phenomena are discussed.
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U2 - 10.1006/obhd.2000.2937
DO - 10.1006/obhd.2000.2937
M3 - Article
C2 - 11461198
AN - SCOPUS:0001588109
VL - 85
SP - 189
EP - 210
JO - Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
JF - Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
SN - 0749-5978
IS - 2
ER -