Prior-independent auctions for risk-averse agents

Hu Fu, Jason D Hartline, Darrell Hoy

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

31 Scopus citations


We study simple and approximately optimal auctions for agents with a particular form of risk-averse pref- erences. We show that, for symmetric agents, the optimal revenue (given a prior distribution over the agent preferences) can be approximated by the first-price auction (which is prior independent), and, for asym- metric agents, the optimal revenue can be approximated by an auction with simple form. These results are based on two technical methods. The first is for upper-bounding the revenue from a risk-averse agent. The second gives a payment identity for mechanisms with pay-your-bid semantics.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationEC 2013 - Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Number of pages18
ISBN (Print)9781450319621
StatePublished - 2013
Event14th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2013 - Philadelphia, PA, United States
Duration: Jun 16 2013Jun 20 2013

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce


Other14th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2013
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityPhiladelphia, PA


  • Auctions
  • First-price auctions
  • Prior-independence
  • Risk aversion

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Science Applications


Dive into the research topics of 'Prior-independent auctions for risk-averse agents'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this