Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling

Shuchi Chawla, Jason D Hartline, David Malec, Balasubramanian Sivan

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the makespan minimization problem with unrelated selfish machines under the assumption that job sizes are stochastic. We design simple truthful mechanisms that under various distributional assumptions provide constant and sublogarithmic approximations to expected makespan. Our mechanisms are prior-independent in that they do not rely on knowledge of the job size distributions. Prior-independent approximation mechanisms have been previously studied for the objective of revenue maximization [13, 11, 26]. In contrast to our results, in prior-free settings no truthful anonymous deterministic mechanism for the makespan objective can provide a sublinear approximation [3].

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationSTOC 2013 - Proceedings of the 2013 ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
Pages51-60
Number of pages10
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013
Event45th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2013 - Palo Alto, CA, United States
Duration: Jun 1 2013Jun 4 2013

Publication series

NameProceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
ISSN (Print)0737-8017

Other

Other45th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2013
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityPalo Alto, CA
Period6/1/136/4/13

Keywords

  • Bayesian mechanism design
  • Prior-independent mechanisms
  • Scheduling

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this