Productivity and Credibility in Industry Equilibrium

Research output: Working paper

Abstract

I analyze a model of production in a competitive environment with heterogeneous firms. Efficient production requires individuals within the organization to take non-contractible actions for which rewards must be informally promised rather than contractually assured. The credibility of such promises emerges from a firm's future competitive rents. Equilibrium competitive rents are inefficiently concentrated at the top. I explore several policy and empirical implications of this result.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Number of pages37
StatePublished - Jun 2016

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Industry equilibrium
Rent
Credibility
Productivity
Competitive environment
Competitive equilibrium
Reward
Heterogeneous firms

Cite this

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