Rational preferences under ambiguity

Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Paolo Ghirardato*, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci, Marciano Siniscalchi

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

62 Scopus citations


This paper analyzes preferences in the presence of ambiguity that are rational in the sense of satisfying the classical ordering condition as well as monotonicity. Under technical conditions that are natural in an Anscombe-Aumann environment, we show that even for such a general preference model, it is possible to identify a set of priors, as first envisioned by Ellsberg (Q J Econ 75:643-669, 1961). We then discuss ambiguity attitudes, as well as unambiguous acts and events, for the class of rational preferences we consider.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)341-375
Number of pages35
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - Oct 2011


  • Ambiguity
  • Rational preferences
  • Unambiguous acts and events

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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