Reasons and religious belief

David Michael Levin*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper purports a limited study of the concept of reason. It analyzes the claim of religious belief to be reasonable. The context for this analysis is an examination of some evidential (criteriological) connections between reasonable belief and ‘(good) reasons’ for such belief. Consideration of the typical sort of evidential connection shows, not surprisingly, that religious belief cannot claim to be reasonable. But it is argued that there is (at least) one other sort of connection, and that it is philosophically plausible to regard this connection as definitive of a quite distinctive sense of ‘reasonable’, with its own kind and style of criteria, according to which religious belief can be thought reasonable.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)371-393
Number of pages23
JournalInquiry (United Kingdom)
Issue number1-4
StatePublished - 1969

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Health Policy


Dive into the research topics of 'Reasons and religious belief'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this